The impact of global trade disruptions on world oil markets by Aldayel, Abdullah et al.
1The Impact of Global Trade Disruptions on World Oil Markets
   
Abdullah Aldayel, AlJawhara Al Quayid, Jennifer Considine 
and Emre Hatipoglu
The Impact of Global Trade Disruptions 
on World Oil Markets
Instant Insight
November 19, 2019 KS--2019-II14
Data Insights
2The Impact of Global Trade Disruptions on World Oil Markets
About KAPSARC
Legal Notice
The King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC) is a   
non-profit global institution dedicated to independent research into energy economics, 
policy, technology and the environment across all types of energy. KAPSARC’s  
mandate is to advance the understanding of energy challenges and opportunities 
facing the world today and tomorrow, through unbiased, independent, and high-caliber 
research for the benefit of society. KAPSARC is located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
© Copyright 2019 King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (“KAPSARC”). 
This Document (and any information, data or materials contained therein) (the 
“Document”) shall not be used without the proper attribution to KAPSARC. The 
Document shall not be reproduced, in whole or in part, without the written permission 
of KAPSARC. KAPSARC makes no warranty, representation or undertaking whether 
expressed or implied, nor does it assume any legal liability, whether direct or indirect, or 
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information that is 
contained in the Document. Nothing in the Document constitutes or shall be implied to 
constitute advice, recommendation or option. The views and opinions expressed in this 
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views or 
position of KAPSARC.  
3The Impact of Global Trade Disruptions on World Oil MarketsThe Impact of Global Trade Disruptions on World Oil Markets
Introduction
After decades of relatively smooth trade liberalization, a wave of protectionist measures and a global 
trade war is now threatening world trade. On September 1, 2019, the United States (U.S.) imposed a new 
series of tariffs on Chinese imports worth more than $100 billion. 
While China has been the most visible target of President Trump’s trade policies, all U.S. trading 
partners, including its allies, have been pressured to renegotiate their trade terms with the U.S. On March 
23, 2018 the U.S. imposed steel and aluminum tariffs, with temporary exemptions granted for some of its 
security partners (the exemptions were later extended to June 1). South Korea, Argentina and Brazil are 
exempt from steel tariffs; Argentina is exempt from aluminum tariffs, and Australia is exempt from both 
permanently (Williams 2019). In June 2018, the U.S. imposed quotas on South Korean, Argentinian and 
Brazilian steel imports, and in July 2018, threatened to impose 25% tariffs on imports of cars and car 
parts. In April 2019, the U.S. proposed tariffs on European dairy and, in May 2019, terminated Turkey’s 
preferential trade agreement (Kirby 2018; Pamuk and Beech 2019).
Scholars and policymakers agree that sustained trade disputes, based on a growing number of tariffs and 
other forms of protectionist measures, will lead to a considerable loss of global gross domestic product 
(GDP). The U.S.-China trade war is already starting to take its toll on the global economy, and experts 
warn of more serious and long-lasting damage to world trade if it becomes protracted. 
In this KAPSARC Instant Insight, we forecast the response of world oil markets to a continuation of the 
global trade war.
Our model simulations suggest three critical insights:
1. Despite a significant fall in global GDP, the price of Brent crude will fall only slightly. 
2. Almost all oil producing countries see a significant cut to their oil production relative to their          
baseline, while the U.S. sees an increase. Saudi Arabia emerges as the swing producer, absorbing a 
significant portion of this production cut.
3. The trade war will lead to backwardation in the price of Brent, which is expected to fall slightly in the 
year following a negative shock to global GDP due to global trade disruptions, falling further in the 
second year of the disruption (2020). In anticipation of this,
a. oil exporters will release a larger part of their inventories onto the market in early 2020, 
followed by a smaller amount in early 2021;
b. oil importers will increase their oil purchases in 2021, capitalizing on lower oil prices.
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In sum, we are at a point where diplomacy is critical to resolving the current global trade disputes. The 
global community could benefit considerably if trade negotiations were to be concluded quickly and 
equitably. The main actors in these trade rows should be cognizant of the unintended consequences of 
their actions for the global economy.
Global trade wars, economic output and oil markets: A KAPSARC 
global oil market simulation 
Various estimates point to a serious threat to world prosperity from an escalating global trade war. President 
Donald Trump’s unique negotiating strategy may have far reaching implications for world oil markets, 
including unintended consequences for the U.S. and its allies. Given that the world economy is already 
showing signs of stress, it is critical that net oil exporters and importers understand how oil markets could 
react to a prolonged trade war and painful negotiations. We use KAPSARC’s Global Vector Autoregression 
(GVAR) model, designed to analyze the potential implications of the global trade war and its associated 
economic shocks on world oil markets.
GVAR simulation results: GDP, oil price, production and inventories
After an initial simulated economic shock, equal to a reduction in real global GDP by 0.3%, to the world 
economy, global GDP continues to decline, deteriorating every year the trade sanctions remain in place. 
Real global GDP falls by 1.22% relative to the baseline in the first year (2019), and even more (-1.53%) 
in the second year of the trade war. Countries in the Group of Seven leading industrial nations (G7) are 
least affected by the sanctions. The trade war has almost twice the negative effect on the GDP of net oil 
exporting countries than it does on the GDP of net oil importing countries. Russia and India experience the 
steepest reductions in their real GDP relative to the baseline of 3% and 2%, respectively.
Real GDP
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World trade war impact on real global GDP
(% deviation from baseline)
First year Second year
Oil price
The real-world price of Brent crude experiences a slight decline in the first year of the trade war, falling by 
less than 1%. As the tariffs remain in place, global GDP and the price of crude oil continue to fall. The oil 
price enters a period of backwardation, where it is expected to continue to decline throughout the two-year 
forecast period. 
Source: KAPSARC global oil market simulation, September 2019.
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Figure 2. World trade war impact on Brent crude price.
Source: KAPSARC global oil market simulation, September 2019.
Figure 1. World trade war impact on real global GDP.
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Figure 3. World trade war impact on crude oil production.
Source: KAPSARC global oil market simulation, September 2019.
Crude oil inventories
Net oil exporting countries drawdown inventories relative to their baseline behavior as they anticipate a 
backwardated market and continued declines in crude oil prices. The effects of this are estimated to be 
most pronounced in the first year of the trade war when prices are expected to peak. However, net oil 
importers would take advantage of lower oil prices in the second year by increasing their strategic and 
commercial inventories. 
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Crude oil production
Saudi Arabia maintains its role of swing producer, with its crude oil production falling by 1.5% below the 
baseline in the first year of the trade war to -2% in the second year of the trade war. The production of other 
producers (OPEC and non-OPEC) also falls, albeit at lower levels. Interestingly, the U.S. is an exception: its 
crude oil production continues to increase slightly throughout the forecast period. This increase is likely due 
to the effects of U.S. monetary policy and an expected decline in long-term U.S. interest rates throughout 
the forecast period. Given the tenuous situation that a global economic downturn would present, an 
unintended consequence of the U.S. escalating the global trade war could be the strain this would put on its 
partners in the Gulf, and the increased uncertainty this would give to international oil markets.
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Figure 4. World trade war impact on oil inventories.
Source: KAPSARC global oil market simulation, September 2019.
A recap and alternative futures
The main prediction of the model is that, if the current trade disputes continue, global GDP and oil 
price falls will be self-perpetuating, further deteriorating the longer the trade war lasts. The long-term 
implications for producers and consumers alike will worsen the longer trade tariffs remain in place. 
However, it may not be too late to reverse the damage. A speedy, fair and equitable renegotiation of 
existing trade deals could increase global GDP, creating a fairer and more efficient global economy. 
KAPSARC’s simulations suggest that a successful end to the global trade war has the potential to add 
over 1% per annum to global GDP, with the developing world and Latin America realizing gains in excess 
of 1.5% over the baseline growth rates.
The potential implications of the end of the global trade war are encouraging for global equity markets 
and pension funds. A former Economic Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, Arthur Laffer, estimates 
that the Dow Jones Industrial Average could gain as many as 10,000 points on the news of a new trade 
deal between the U.S. and China. The KAPSARC GVAR simulation suggests that U.S. equity prices will 
increase by approximately 2.7% over baseline levels, and in a best-case scenario they could rise by 6.3% 
in the year following a hypothetical successful trade deal between the U.S. and China. The successfully 
renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), renamed the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA), concluded in November 2018, supports the expectation of a successful 
trade deal between the U.S. and China. Canadian GDP rebounded to record levels following the final 
USMCA negotiations and the subsequent lifting of additional tariffs in May 2019 (Kirby 2018). The full 
impact of this agreement on the economies of Canada and Mexico remains to be seen. 
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Figure 5. Successful renegotiation: Impact on the Brent crude price.
Source: KAPSARC global oil market simulation, September 2019.
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Figure 6. Successful renegotiation: Impact on real GDP.
Source: KAPSARC global oil market simulation, September 2019.
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Note: The high and low cases represent the upper and lower borders of the 90% confidence interval. Median represents the median 
point estimate of the simulation.
On September 9, 2019, the Saudi Energy Minister, HRH Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, noted at the World 
Energy Congress in Abu Dhabi that those involved in the current trade disputes do have the “wisdom 
and sensibility to try to overcome these [trade] issues without having to impact the economy in the most 
drastic way” (Nehme et al. 2019). Diplomacy, in this respect, remains a critical tool for settling existing 
differences over trade policy and continues to play an important role in shaping the future of the world 
economy and oil markets.
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Global trade and American politics
Economists have firmly established that free trade significantly increases the overall welfare of societies. 
Still, trade liberalization often runs into resistance from domestic politics. The benefits from free trade are 
usually dispersed across very large segments of society (e.g., car prices throughout North America would 
be reduced by a couple of hundred dollars without tariffs). Losses, on the other hand, are concentrated 
on a small part of the populace (e.g., half of the working population of a small town losing their jobs due 
to a steel factory closure and these jobs moving overseas). While such losses can mobilize those they 
affect to take political action, the benefits from trade liberalization are usually too small to convince each 
beneficiary to politically mobilize in a similar manner (Frye and Mansfield 2004). 
President Trump’s 2020 electoral strategy, like in 2016, might mobilize the concentrated group of voters 
who have lost their jobs or otherwise witnessed a decrease in their welfare due to globalization and 
free trade. His ‘America First’ campaign rests on the promise of bringing ‘good, well-paying’ jobs back 
to the U.S. The renegotiation of existing trade deals to make them ‘fairer’ and ‘more equitable’ would 
address concerns such as state-sponsored dumping (i.e., selling at a price lower than the marginal cost 
of production) and intellectual property rights infringement. This renegotiation constitutes a critical part 
of President Trump’s campaign (The White House 2019). The renegotiation of NAFTA (now the USMCA) 
has been one of President Trump’s most significant acts during his term in office, in line with his election 
promise. 
However, trade disruptions continue to escalate. Currently, U.S. tariffs on goods produced in China total 
$550 billion, while Chinese tariffs applied to goods produced in the U.S. total $185 billion. On September 
2, 2019, China lodged an official World Trade Organization (WTO) tariff case against the U.S., further 
aggravating already strained relations between the two countries (Wong and Koty 2019). 
The impact of U.S. tariffs on other countries renegotiating their trade deals with the U.S. has been 
overwhelmingly negative. A recent study by the New York Federal Reserve, Princeton University and 
New York University argued that the protectionist policies of the current U.S. administration have led to a 
welfare loss to the U.S. of $1.4 billion per month since 2018 (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). 
Various other estimates point to a serious threat to world prosperity resulting from the ongoing trade war. 
Mesquita (2019) estimates a full-blown U.S.-China trade war would reduce global GDP by 0.7% in 2019. 
Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have already revised their global growth 
forecasts for 2019 down by 0.3%, from 3.5% to 3.2% and 2.9% to 2.6%, respectively. KPMG estimates a 
moderate to severe global trade war would result in a reduction in global GDP of between 1.3% to 3.3% 
in the following years (Rynne 2018).
Trade tariffs aside, the uncertainty caused by the ongoing trade renegotiations is impacting the global 
economy. Bloomberg Economics estimates the cost to be around 0.6%, double the impact of the trade 
tariffs on global GDP (Business Today 2019).
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Given that major economies including China, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Russia, 
Argentina and Brazil are either already in or on the verge of an economic recession, an adverse trade 
shock risks impacting the real economy, beyond the commodities markets (Long 2019). The IMF and World 
Bank warned that Latin America and the Euro area were also at considerable risk of an adverse trade 
shock. The Eurozone’s exports, for example, account for more than 40% of its GDP (World Bank 2019; IMF 
2019). 
The KAPSARC Global Oil Model: A primer to GVAR
We use KAPSARC’s GVAR model, designed to analyze the implications of economic shocks on world oil 
markets, to gauge the effect of the current trade disputes on crude oil prices, production and inventories. 
Two characteristics of the model make it particularly suited to this analysis. The first is that the GVAR 
framework is specifically designed to account for the interaction between many countries, each with their 
own political and legislative systems. This is important because the effects of severe shocks and global 
imbalances, such as a global trade war, are contagious and cannot be contained to one country or region. 
The second is that world oil prices, supplies and inventories are modeled jointly with key macroeconomic 
variables, including short- and long-term interest rates, inflation, equity prices and real GDP. This enables 
the model to capture the nuances of complex economic interrelationships. 
To project the effects of the current trade disputes, we first established a baseline simulation, taking the 
end of September 2018 as a reference point. This timing coincides with the imposition of trade sanctions 
by the U.S. and China on each other, and an escalation of the U.S. threats to withdraw from the WTO. We 
simulated the subsequent year-long global trade war in our model by shocking real global GDP by one 
standard error, which amounts to a 0.29% reduction in GDP. The size of this shock is roughly in line with the 
estimates of various industry analysts, including those from the IMF, KPMG, and Bloomberg (Holl and Sam 
2019). Box 1 gives an overview of this baseline.
Box 1: A snapshot of the oil market in September 2018
• China and the U.S. are the two largest oil importers of crude oil globally. Friction in their trading 
relations can be expected to reduce the global demand for oil.
• U.S. crude oil inventories levels have declined by almost 60 million barrels in the past three 
months and are expected to continue to fall (EIA 2019).
• The U.S. rig count and well completion in shale plays is expected to increase over the next few 
months, resulting in more oil production, especially from larger companies. 
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• Crude oil exports to the U.S. from Iraq have decreased from 13.3 million barrels in January 2018 
to 11.3 million barrels in May 2018. Exports to the U.S. from Saudi Arabia have decreased from 
22.0 million barrels to 14.0 million barrels during the same period.
• OECD commercial inventories of crude and liquids was 60.4 days of supply in August 2019, 1.5 
days below its five-year moving average.
• China’s crude stocks continue to rise, reaching 200 million barrels in July. They rose almost 300% 
from July 2018 to July 2019.
• U.S. crude oil exports have increased significantly over the past three years. However, the U.S. is 
still a net oil importer (see Figure 1).
Sources: KAPSARC; EIA; OECD 2019.
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